Abstract. We prove that the (non-intuitionistic) law of the double negation shift has a bounded functional interpretation with bar recursive functionals of finite type. As an application, we show that full numerical comprehension is compatible with the uniformities introduced by the characteristic principles of the bounded functional interpretation for the classical case. §1. Introduction and background. In 1962 [14], Clifford Spector gave a remarkable characterization of the provably recursive functionals of full secondorder arithmetic (a.k.a. analysis). The central result of his paper is an extension, from arithmetic to analysis, of the (then quite recent) dialectica interpretation of Gödel of 1958 [7] . Spector's extension relies on a form of well-founded recursion known as bar recursion. The name comes from the intuitionistic studies of L. E. J. Brouwer and his contentious bar theorem of the nineteen twenties.
§1. Introduction and background. In 1962 [14] , Clifford Spector gave a remarkable characterization of the provably recursive functionals of full secondorder arithmetic (a.k.a. analysis). The central result of his paper is an extension, from arithmetic to analysis, of the (then quite recent) dialectica interpretation of Gödel of 1958 [7] . Spector's extension relies on a form of well-founded recursion known as bar recursion. The name comes from the intuitionistic studies of L. E. J. Brouwer and his contentious bar theorem of the nineteen twenties.
Spector extends the bar notions to all finite types. There are various insights in Spector's paper, but we find that the crucial insight is that the (nonintuitionistic) law of the double negation shift,
DNS :
∀n ¬¬A(n) → ¬¬∀n A(n)
(n is a natural number variable, A is an arbitrary formula) has a dialectica interpretation using bar recursive functionals of finite-type. The existence of this interpretation is enough to ensure the interpretation of the negative translation of full numerical comprehension
where A is an arbitrary formula of the language of finite-order arithmetic. Here, the superscripts denote the type of the variables: type 0 is the type of natural numbers, type 1 is the type of the functions from natural numbers to natural numbers. We assume that the reader is familiar with these type-theoretic notations. [1] and the recent [12] are good sources for the dialectica interpretation and related issues (including bar-recursive functionals). The bounded functional interpretation was introduced in [5] . It is an interpretation based on a new transformation of formulas A ; A B :=∃a∀bA B (a, b) and which relies essentially on majorizability notions. The characteristic principles of this interpretation state "uniformities" which are not set theoretically true. A conspicuous result is that the characteristic principles (for the classical case) refute, within a base theory, simple forms of comprehension for type 1 functions (see section 8 of [3] ). In other words, the mentioned "uniformities" are not compatible with type 1 comprehension. Notwithstanding, by the soundness theorem of the interpretation, they entail (e.g.) true Π 0 2 -sentences only. The reader can find in [3] some discussions and comparisons between Gödel's dialectica interpretation, the bounded functional interpretation and, also, the related monotone functional interpretation of Ulrich Kohlenbach (introduced in [11] ). In the same article, the second author expressed the belief that the uniformities introduced by the bounded functional interpretation (for the classical case) are compatible with full numerical comprehension (i.e., type 0 comprehension). The results of Section 5 below confirm that this belief was correct.
The strong majorizability relations were introduced by Marc Bezem in [2] (after the seminal work of William Howard [10] ):
σ yv) Bezem also defines the structure M ω of the strongly majorizable functionals and proved that the bar recursors are well-defined in this structure (bar recursors are not well-defined in the standard set-theoretical type structure). The bounded functional interpretation uses an intensional version of Bezem's majorizability relations. These relations (one for each finite type) are called intensional because they are partly governed by a rule:
A bd → s ρ→σ t where A bd is an intensional bounded formula and u and v are variables which do not appear in the conclusion of the rule (named as RL ). We assume that the reader is familiar with the intuitionistic arithmetic theory HA ω and its bounded functional interpretation.
The main purpose of this paper is to show that DNS has a bounded functional interpretation. As discussed in [13] , the dialectica interpretation of the intuitionistic law ¬¬A ∧ ¬¬B → ¬¬(A ∧ B) can be seen as a "finite" version of the interpretation of DNS. Moreover, since this law is a theorem of HA ω , it must have a bounded functional interpretation. We work out this interpretation explicitly in the brief Section 2 as a warm up for the interpretation of DNS. The latter interpretation cannot be done solely in terms of the primitive recursive functionals in the sense of Gödel. Further terms are needed and, following the work of Spector, we effect this interpretation using terms defined by bar recursion. It turns out that the bounded functional interpretation of DNS is somewhat delicate, and we dedicate Section 4 almost entirely to it. The preceding Section 3 describes the theory in which the interpretation of DNS is verified. This theory contains the set ∆ M ω of all universal sentences (with intensional bounded matrices) whose flattenings are true in the structure M ω . This is not optimal, of course. However, we chose this route because an optimal treatment would be a distraction from the main thrust of the interpretation of DNS. Moreover, the treatment of CA 0 in Section 5 relies essentially on some facts of ∆ M ω . We would like to thank Jaime Gaspar and Paulo Oliva for some discussions. We also thank an anonymous referee for pertinent observations which improved the final version of this paper. We are special grateful to the referee for pointing out an improvement in the case of arithmetical comprehension. §2. A not so simple interpretation. Let A and B be arbitrary formulas of the language of HA ω and suppose that
. As a matter of fact, we should have written (possibly empty) tuples of variables in the previous quantifications. However, for ease of reading, we have omitted (and will omit) the tuple notation. In order to obtain the bounded functional interpretation of ¬¬A∧¬¬B → ¬¬(A∧B), a straightforward computation shows that we must produce monotone a §3. The bounded functional interpretation extended to bar recursors. In this section, we extend the language of HA ω with new constants B ρ,σ , the bar recursors, and consider the following defining axioms BR ρ,σ :
where
, and (s, n) 0→ρ and (s, n * x) 0→ρ are defined as
Note that whereas s 0→ρ denotes infinite sequences of objects of type ρ, s, n, although formally of type 0 → ρ, is meant to stand for the initial subsequence of s with length n, s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s n−1 , 0, 0, . . . , and s, n * x is the concatenation of the finite sequence s, n with x ('s, n * x' is meant to be a "ternary" functional in s, n and x).
Following the treatment of Kohlenbach in [12], we officially take simultaneous bar-recursion with tuples of variables (note that the 'neutral' treatment of equality in HA ω does not seem to allow a reduction to ordinary bar recursion without tuples). As in the previous section, we omitted (and will omit) the tuple notation. Let us write BR for the collection of all the statements of the form BR ρ,σ . Bar recursion is a principle of definition while bar induction is a corresponding principle of proof, in analogy with the usual recursors and induction. The scheme of bar induction BI applied to formulas P and Q is given by
where Hyp1 : ∀s ∈ M N ∃n ∈ N P (s, n, n)
It is well-known that we can argue by bar induction in the structure M ω (see, for instance, [12] for a closely related formulation).
Let us consider the set ∆ M ω as described in the introduction: the set of all universal sentences (with intensional bounded matrices) whose flattenings happen to be true in the structure M ω of the majorizable functionals. We remind the reader that the flattening of a formula of the intensional language is obtained by replacing each sign by the corresponding majorizability sign ≤ * (see [4] , or the end of section 6 of [5] ). Even though the statements in BR are in ∆ M ω (they are universal), we will write HA ω + BR + ∆ M ω instead of the shorter HA ω + ∆ M ω . The inclusion of the acronym 'BR' has the advantage of indicating that our language contains the bar recursive functionals.
Theorem 3.1. HA ω + BR + ∆ M ω is a majorizability theory (i.e., for every closed term t there is a closed term q such that HA ω + BR + ∆ M ω t q).
Proof. It suffices to check that the bar recursive functionals have majorants (within the theory). Let B * be given by B * ψzuns = max i≤n B p ψzuis where
We have just seen that HA ω +BR+∆ M ω is a majorizability theory. Moreover, the sentences of BR + ∆ M ω are universal (with bounded intensional matrices) and, therefore, self-interpretable. Hence, by the main result of [5] : 
then, there are monotone closed terms t of appropriate type such that
.
In the above, P ω [ ] consists of the characteristic principles of the bounded functional interpretation for the intuitionistic case. These principles are described in [5] . (We use the notation A * for the flattening of the formula A.) §4. The interpretation of the double negation shift. This section is dedicated to the proof of the following theorem:
Proof. Let A be (the universal closure of) an instance of DNS. By the above theorem,
The result now follows by characterization theorem (see [5] ) of the bounded functional interpretation (intuitionistic case).
In order to prove Theorem 4.1, let A(n 0 ) be an arbitrary formula of the language of HA ω + BR and suppose that A B (n) is∃a∀bA B (n, a, b) (we simplify and omit parameters). A straightforward calculation shows that to interpret DNS, as formulated in the introductory section, we must produce monotone n * , f * and g * (depending only on given monotone φ, ψ 1 and ψ 2 ) such that the statement
is provable in HA ω + BR + ∆ M ω (note that, as observed in the previous section, we disregard tuples of functionals). Since the above statement is universal (in φ, ψ 1 and ψ 2 ), we need only to show that its flattening
ω (given φ, ψ 1 and ψ 2 monotone in the ordinary, flattened, sense). Of course, if the concern is with truth in M ω , then we can simplify the above formula and substitute the negative universals by appropriate existentials. That notwithstanding, we will argue intuitionistically below (in tune with the argument of Section 2). For instance, the argument given below can be adapted to show that it holds for the theory HA ω + BR + ∆ i , where ∆ i is the set of all universal sentences (with intensional bounded matrices) whose flattenings are provable in E-HA ω + BR + BI. Here, the acronym E means that full extensionality is present (we are being careful at this point because our actual uses of extensionality probably do not require E). Notice that
From here onwards and until the end of the section, we work with the ordinary majorizability sign. The statements that we prove are meant to be true in M ω (as noticed, with suitable modifications, they are even provable in E-HA ω +BR+BI). When we use abbreviations concerning monotonicity, they are meant to be in the ordinary sense. We use ∀x ≤ * a A to abbreviate ∀x (x ≤ * a → A), etc. We introduce a bit of notation: if ψ is in M (0→ρ)→σ , write ψ for the functional of the same type defined by ψ s := ψ(s M ). In the sequel, we use some simple properties ([12] 
is a good reference). For instance, if s(i) is monotone for
Finally, the following fact is handy: for monotone r, 0 ≤ * r (here 0 denotes the zero functional of the same type as r).
Let us fix φ, ψ 1 and ψ 2 monotone of appropriate types. We define B ns according to the following clauses:
where n is a natural number, s ∈ M N ρ , c = φng s,n and g s,n = λx.ψ 2 (B (n + 1)(s, n * x)). The value B ns is in M N ρ . In fact, we should think of this value as a finite sequence of elements of M ρ . It is clear that B can be defined by bar recursion.
Before we give n * , f * and g * , it is convenient to study some properties of B .
Proof. We argue by bar induction. Take
Let us see that we have Hyp1-Hyp4 of bar induction. As we know, Hyp1 holds in the structure of majorizable functionals. Hyp2 and Hyp3 are clear. Let us focus on Hyp4. Take arbitrary s and n and assume that, for every x ∈ M ρ , ∀i ≤ n+1 (ψ 1 (s, n * x, i) ≥ i) → ∀i < n+1 ((s, n * x) i = B (n+1)(s, n * x)i). We must show Q(s, n, n). Suppose that ∀i ≤ n (ψ 1 s, i ≥ i). By definition of B , B n(s, n) = B (n + 1)(s, n * c) with c given by c = φn(λx.ψ 2 (B (n + 1)(s, n * x))).
Either ψ 1 (s, n * c) < n + 1 or ψ 1 (s, n * c) ≥ n + 1. If the first case occurs, then B (n + 1)(s, n * c) = s, n * c and also B ns, n = s, n * c. From this it follows that ∀i < n (s, n i = B n(s, n)i). On the other hand, if ψ 1 (s, n * c) ≥ n+1, then, by the initial assumption with x = c, we get ∀i < n + 1((s, n * c)i = B (n + 1)(s, n * c)i). It clearly follows that ∀i < n (s, ni = B n(s, n)i), as desired.
The following lemma (and respective proof) is similar to the corresponding result concerning the majorability proof of section 11.
As in the lemma above, Hyp1 and Hyp2 hold. Let us check that Hyp3 obtains. Suppose that P (r, n, n). Take s such that ∀i < n(si ≤
Therefore, we have B ns, n = B ns = s, k 1 and B nr, n = B nr = r, k 0 . Hence, ∀j(B ns, nj ≤ * B nr, nj). So, Q(r, n, n).
It remains to see Hyp4, i.e., ∀xQ(r, n * x, n + 1) → Q(r, n, n). So, assume that ∀xQ(r, n * x, n + 1). If ∃k ≤ n(ψ 1 r, k < k), then by what was shown in Hyp3 we get Q(r, n, n). We are restricted to the case ∀k ≤ n(ψ 1 r, k ≥ k). Let s be given such that ∀i < n(si ≤ * ri). By definition of B , B nr, n = B (n + 1)(r, n * c), where c = φng r,n and g r,n = λx.ψ 2 (B (n + 1)(r, n * x)).
We claim that g r,n is monotone. We must show that x ≤ * z → ψ 2 (B (n + 1)(r, n * x)) ≤ * ψ 2 (B (n + 1)(r, n * z)).
Given that x ≤ * z, it is clear that ∀i < n + 1((r, n * x)i ≤ * (r, n * z)i). Since we have Q(r, n * z, n + 1) we may conclude that ∀j(B (n + 1)(r, n * x)j ≤ * B (n + 1)(r, n * z)j), and, therefore, by the monotonicity of ψ 2 , it follows that ψ 2 (B (n+1)(r, n * x)) ≤ * ψ 2 (B (n + 1)(r, n * z)). We also claim that c is monotone. However, this is an immediate consequence of the definition of c and the previous claim, given that φ is monotone.
With these two claims proved, we show that ∀j(B ns, nj ≤ * B nr, nj). We discuss two cases.
The first case is when ∀k ≤ n(ψ 1 s, k ≥ k). In this case, we have B ns, n = B (n + 1)(s, n * d), where d = φng s,n and g s,n = λx.ψ 2 (B (n + 1)(s, n * x)).
We prove that g s,n ≤ * g r,n . It is sufficient to show that x ≤ * z → ψ 2 (B (n + 1)(s, n * x)) ≤ * ψ 2 (B (n + 1)(r, n * z)).
Well, if x ≤ * z then ∀i < n + 1((s, n * x)i ≤ * (r, n * z)i). By Q(r, n * z, n + 1) and the monotonicity of ψ 2 , the claim follows.
It is now clear that d ≤ * c. Therefore, ∀i < n + 1((s, n * d)i ≤ * (r, n * c)i). By Q(r, n * c, n + 1) we may infer ∀j(B (n + 1)(s, n * d)j ≤ * B (n + 1)(r, n * c)j). At this point we only have to observe that B (n + 1)(s, n * d) = B ns, n and that B (n + 1)(r, n * c) = B nr, n. Finally, the second case is when ∃k ≤ n(ψ 1 s, k < k). Take k 0 least such that ψ 1 s, k 0 < k 0 . Note that k 0 ≤ n. By definition of B , B ns, n = s, k 0 . By the previous lemma, we have ∀i < n(r, ni = B nr, ni). It readily follows that ∀j < k 0 (B ns, nj ≤ * B nr, nj). The claim also extends for j ≥ k 0 provided that all the entries of the sequence B nr, n are monotone (and, therefore, majorize 0). This is easily seen to be the case. Observe that Q(r, n * c, n + 1) implies that, for all j, B (n + 1)(r, n * c)j is monotone. But, as we know, B (n + 1)(r, n * c) = B nr, n.
The following is an immediate consequence of the above lemma:
Corollary 4.5. Let n ∈ N. Consider s, r ∈ M N ρ and suppose that si ≤ * ri, for all i < n. Then λx.ψ 2 (B (n + 1)(s, n * x)) ≤ * λx.ψ 2 (B (n + 1)(r, n * x)).
In particular, given r ∈ M N ρ such that, for each i < n, ri is monotone, then λx.ψ 2 (B (n + 1)(r, n * x)) is monotone.
In order to ease readability, we write s0, s1, . . . , s(n − 1), 0, 0, . . . to denote s ∈ M N ρ such that si = 0 for i ≥ n. Let us define recursively
Using the above corollary, it is clear by induction that the a * i 's and the g * i 's are monotone. Define:
Observe that f * and g * are monotone. The remainder of the section is dedicated to proving that the monotone functionals n * , f * and g * defined above (which depend only on the given monotone φ, ψ 1 and ψ 2 ) lend themselves to interpret DNS. More precisely, we show that the two statements
Definition 4.6. A sequence of monotone elements a 0 , . . . , a n of M ρ is nice if, for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n, a i ≤ * φig i , where
Note that each g i above depends only on a 0 , . . . , a i−1 for its definition. We prove some facts about nice sequences.
Lemma 4.7. Consider a 0 , . . . , a n a nice sequence, with associated functions g 0 . . . , g n , g n+1 . For all i ≤ n + 1, g i is monotone, g i ≤ * g * i and, for i ≤ n,
Proof. The result is easily proved by complete induction on i ≤ n using Corollary 4.5.
At this point, we can already prove the following:
Proposition 4.8. Under the hypothesis (4) we have, for all n ≤ n * ,
Proof. The proof is made by induction on n. For n = 0, the conclusion comes from (4):
To prove the induction step, take the induction hypothesis:
with n < n * and assumẽ
which is equivalent to
By (4), if a 0 , . . . , a n is a nice sequence and g n+1 is the (n + 1)th associated function, then ¬∀a ≤ * φ(n + 1)g n+1 ¬∀b ≤ * g n+1 a A B (n + 1, a, b). That is:
Applying the intuitionist rule
we get∀
The contradiction follows from the induction hypothesis.
In particular, under hypothesis (4), we have:
We will show that the above leads to a contradiction under the hypothesis (5). Firstly, we need to prove some further facts about nice sequences:
Lemma 4.9. Let a 0 , . . . , a n * be a nice sequence and g 0 , . . . , g n * (and g n * +1 ) its associated functions. Then we have ∀n < n * (g n+1 a n+1 ≤ * g n a n ).
Proof. Let n < n * . By definition, we have g n a n = ψ 2 (B (n + 1) a 0 . . . , a n , 0, 0, . . . ) g n+1 a n+1 = ψ 2 (B (n + 2) a 0 . . . , a n , a n+1 , 0, 0, . . . ).
We consider two cases. Suppose that there is k ≤ n such that ψ 1 a 0 , . . . , a k , 0, 0, . . . < k + 1. Let k 0 be the least such k. Then, by definition of B B (n + 1) a 0 , . . . , a n , 0, 0, . . . = a 0 , . . . , a k0 , 0, 0, . . .   B (n + 2) a 0 , . . . , a n , a n+1 , 0, 0, . . . = a 0 , . . . , a k0 , 0, 0, . . . Therefore, g n+1 a n+1 = g n a n . Note that g n a n is monotone, since a 0 , . . . , a k0 are monotone. Now, for the second case: ∀k ≤ n ψ 1 a 0 , . . . , a k , 0, 0, . . . ≥ k + 1. In this case B (n + 1) a 0 , . . . , a n , 0, 0, . . . = B (n + 2) a 0 , . . . , a n , c, 0, 0, . . . , where c = φ(n + 1)g n+1 . Since, a n+1 ≤ * φ(n + 1)g n+1 = c, then
. . , a n , c, 0, 0, . . . ), as desired.
Given a = a 0 , . . . , a n * a nice sequence, ψ 1 a 0 , . . . , a n * , 0, 0, . . .
Define f a as a 0 , . . . , a k0 , 0, 0, . . .
Lemma 4.10. Let a = a 0 , . . . , a n * be a nice sequence, with associated functions g 0 , . . . , g n * (and g n * +1 ). Take f a as defined above. Then, ψ 2 f a ≤ * g n a n , for all n ≤ n * .
Proof. We show that ψ 2 f a = g n * a n * . With the help of the previous lemma, this entails our result. By definition, f a = a 0 , . . . , a k0 , 0, 0, . . . M , where k 0 is least satisfying ψ 1 a 0 , . . . , a k0 , 0, 0, . . . M < k 0 + 1. According to the definition of B , B (n * + 1) a 0 , . . . , a n * , 0, 0, . . . = a 0 , . . . , a k0 , 0, 0, . . . . Therefore: ψ 2 f a = ψ 2 (B (n * + 1) a 0 , . . . , a n * , 0, 0, . . . ) = g n * a n * .
Lemma 4.11. Assume that statement (5) holds, and let a = a 0 , . . . , a n * be a nice sequence, with associated functions g 0 , . . . , g n * (and g n * +1 ). In this situation,
for f a defined as above.
Proof. Assume ∀n ≤ ψ 1 f a∀ b ≤ * g n a n A B (n, a n , b). By the above lemma,
Let f a = a 0 , . . . , a k0 , 0, 0, . . . M . By definition, ψ 1 f a ≤ k 0 . Now, if n ≤ ψ 1 f a , we clearly have a n ≤ * f a n. Using the monotonicity of A B in the entry of a n , we get ∀n ≤ ψ 1 f a∀ b ≤ * ψ 2 f a A B (n, f a n, b). This contradicts (5).
Let us take stock. We have showed in the previous lemma that, under the hypothesis (5), ∀a 0 , . . . , a n * (∀n ≤ n * (a n ≤ * φng n ) → ¬∀n ≤ ψ 1 f a∀ b ≤ g n a n A B (n, a n , b)).
Equivalently, ∀a 0 , . . . , a n * ¬(∀n ≤ n * (a n ≤ * φng n ) ∧ ∀n ≤ ψ 1 f a∀ b ≤ g n a n A B (n, a n , b)).
Now, since ψ 1 f a ≤ n * , this entails ∀a 0 , . . . , a n * ¬∀n ≤ n * (a n ≤ * φng n ∧∀b ≤ g n a n A B (n, a n , b)).
We have reached a contradiction with (6). Theorem 4.1 is now proved. §5. The interpretation of full numerical comprehension. As mentioned in the introduction, Spector introduced bar recursive functionals in order to effect a dialectica interpretation of full numerical comprehension. The interpretation is done within the classical setting via a negative (Gödel-Gentzen like) translation A ; A g of formulas. The soundness theorem of the bounded functional interpretation within the classical setting reads as follows:
Theorem 5.1 (Soundness). Let A(z) be a formula of the language of PA ω + BR+∆ M ω with free variables z, and assume that (
bd [ ] A(z) then there are monotone closed terms t of appropriate type such that
* (z, ta, c).
In the above, P ω bd [ ] is constituted by the characteristic principles of the bounded functional interpretation for the classical case. These principles are described in [5] and, in a more perspicuous form, in [4] . Our aim is to show that
As discussed in [3] and [4], the principles in P ω bd [ ] embody uniformities which are absent from the set-theoretic world. Already very simple instances of comprehension for type 1 functionals are incompatible with these uniformities. It was nevertheless suggested in [3] that full numerical comprehension is compatible with such uniformities. The above soundness theorem, together with the fact that CA 0 is a consequence of
shows that this is indeed the case. We argue this fact in a rather indirect way, relying on the work of the previous section. We will show that
where AC 0,ω is the form of choice ∀n 0 ∃xA(n, x) → ∃f ∀nA(n, f n), for arbitrary formulas A (x can be of any type). It is well known how to derive CA 0 from AC 0,ω in a classical setting. In effect, let A(n) be an arbitrary formula. By classical logic, ∀n∃k ((k = 0 ∧ A(n)) ∨ (k = 1 ∧ ¬A(n))). By AC 0,ω (only AC 0,0 is needed), there is f 0→0 which witnesses such k. Of course, we get ∀n(f n = 0 ↔ A(n)), as desired.
We first prove the weaker statement:
where bAC 0,ω is the principle ∀n 0 ∃xA(n, x) →∃f ∀n∃x f nA(n, x), for arbitrary formulas A (x can be of any type). Observe that if we follow the argument above, this weaker statement is found wanting for deriving CA 0 because bAC 0,ω only provides a bound for the k (1 is a trivial bound) , not an exact k. In order to prove the weaker statement, we show that
Let us see why this does the job. On the one hand, by Theorem 3.2, we get
we must see each instance of bAC 0,ω as given by its corresponding universal closure). On the other hand, by the characterization theorem of the bounded functional interpretation for the classical case (see [4]), we have
The result follows. We should point out that the characterization theorem of [4] was formulated for a direct bounded functional interpretation of the classical theory PA ω , whereas here we are applying it to the indirect interpretation A ; (A g ) B , via a negative translation. That notwithstanding, the characterization theorem still holds in this indirect case. For instance, we can rely on Jaime Gaspar's factorization [6] of the direct interpretation in terms of a negative translation and the (intuitionistic) bounded functional interpretation. Even though Gaspar's factorization concerns the so-called Krivine negative translation, it is not difficult to see that it also applies to the Gödel-Gentzen translation using the fact that both translations are intuitionistically equivalent.
The presence of the bar recursors and of the corresponding axioms BR are paramount for proving the next result.
Proof. This relies on the adaptation of a well-known argument. The negative translation of bAC 0,ω may be taken to be
Assume ∀n¬¬∃x A g (n, x). At this juncture, we rely on the work of the previous section, namely on Corollary 4.2. Therefore, we get ¬¬∀n∃xA g (n, x). Since ∀n∃xA g (n, x) →∃f ∀n∃x f nA g (n, x) is included in P ω [ ], we get (by intuitionistic logic) ¬¬∀n∃xA g (n, x) → ¬¬∃f ∀n∃x f nA g (n, x) and, therefore, by Modus Ponens, ¬¬∃f ∀n∃x f nA g (n, x). This entails our result.
We now prove AC 0,ω from bAC 0,ω within PA ω + BR + ∆ M ω + P ω bd [ ], and this fact proves our aim. It is convenient to introduce the following form of (ineffective) choice, which we call tameAC: ∀f ∃h f ∀x (∃z f xA bd (x, z) → A bd (x, hx)), for (intensional) bounded formulas A bd . On the one hand, it is well known that arithmetical comprehension follows from Π 0 1 -comprehension. On the other hand, this latter case of comprehension obviously follows from Π 0 1 -AC 0,0 (i.e., AC 0,0 restricted to Π 0 1 -matrices). We are left to prove this form of choice. Let us assume ∀n∃k∀rA qf (n, k, r), where n, k and r are numerical variables and A qf (n, k, r) is a quantifier-free formula (possibly with parameters). By bAC 0,ω , there is a monotone f such that ∀n∃k ≤ f n∀rA qf (n, k, r). In particular, ∀l∀n∃k ≤ f n∀r ≤ lA qf (n, k, r). By bounded search, we get ∀l∃h ≤ 1 f ∀n∀r ≤ lA qf (n, hn, r). We may suppose ∀l∃h 1 f ∀n∀r ≤ lA qf (n, hn, r), either by appealing to the construction of h or, alternatively, by replacing h by min 1 (h, f ) and noticing that h appears only in the (extensional) context "hn" in the matrix (observe that, for monotone f , min 1 (h, f ) 1 f ). Hence ∀s∀l∃h 1 f ∀n ≤ s∀r ≤ lA qf (n, hn, r), and, by bounded (contra) collection, ∃h 1 f ∀n∀rA qf (n, hn, r). We conclude ∃h∀n∀rA qf (n, hn, r), as wanted.
Our last result subsumes the fact that the theory PA ω + AC 0,ω + P Moreover, M ω |=∀a∀z ≤ * a∀c ((A g ) B ) * (z, ta, c).
Spector's result of 1962 was subsequently improved by Howard [9] , where it is shown that (the negative translation of) the principle of dependent choices has a dialectica interpretation using bar recursive functionals. We conjecture that "dependent choices" has also a bounded functional interpretation.
